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ABSTRACT 
 
A leading idea in evolutionary psychology and philosophy of mind is that the basic 
architecture and dynamics of the mind are very old, presumably dating back to the 
Stone Age. Theories based on this idea are liable to paint a caricature of our ancestors 
by projecting our modern self-conception onto earlier minds. I argue that this ‘Flint-
stones Fallacy’ is an underrated risk, relieved neither by standard biological arguments 
nor by arguments from psychology and philosophy. Indeed, each of these fields has 
better arguments for the contrary view that the mind as we know it from present-day 
experience is not ancient at all. 
Keywords: philosophy of mind; ancient minds; evolutionary psychology; folk psy-
chology; Flintstones fallacy; overinterpretation; cultural variation. 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
While theories of mind in the second half of the 20th century have not been 
particularly keen on questions of history and development, the situation has 
changed with the rise of disciplines such as evolutionary psychology and cogni-
tive archaeology (see, e.g., Tooby and Cosmides 1992; Donald 1993; Mithen 
1996; Noble and Davidson 1996; Deacon 1997; Donald 2001). Theories in the-
se fields generally concentrate on minds in deep history and on the far ends of 
the evolutionary tree. Philosophers have picked up the trend. They often express 
concerns about the methodology of evolutionary psychology and its conceptual 
foundations (as philosophers do), but on the whole they tend to support the pro-
ject (see, e.g., Gärdenfors 2003; Bermúdez 2003; Corbey 2006). The preoccupa-
tion with deep history and distant origins betrays a presumption of psychologi-
cal continuity, commonly backed up by the idea that the mind is a native asset 
of the biological brain, which is presumed to be responsive only to pressures on 
an evolutionary timescale. So, when traveling back in human history one may 
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expect mind and brain to stay roughly the same during most of the journey. The 
recent past is by implication uneventful. 
Also moral considerations may bear on the issue. According to a long-
standing Western tradition, the mind is the seat of human dignity and man’s 
defining characteristic. From that perspective, changes in the nature of con-
scious minds on anything short of an evolutionary timescale would compromise 
the moral unity of mankind. Even if animals and early hominids can be exclud-
ed from our peer group (to which some would strongly object), drawing the line 
closer to home is insufferable. 
Regardless of the moral concerns at stake, I will argue that deep history is 
not the right place to start when studying the mind’s history. It makes us suscep-
tible of a particular type of fallacious reasoning which I shall call the Flintstones 
Fallacy (section 2). The fallacy is irredeemable: neither standard biological 
arguments are helpful (section 3), nor arguments from psychology (section 4) 
and philosophy (section 5). Indeed, each of these fields has better arguments for 
the contrary view that the human mind is neither ancient nor a natural asset of 
the brain. 
 
2. THE FLINTSTONES FALLACY 
 
Fred Flintstone, the Stone Age protagonist in the legendary TV series from 
the 1960s, was the spitting image of a modern human being. The artists willful-
ly projected modern mentality onto Stone Age man to create a comical effect, 
and they were very successful at it. Now, the idea that the conscious mind must 
have been basically the same throughout most of human history makes psychol-
ogy do much the same thing that is funny in the Flintstones, namely, to project 
onto earlier humans (as well as hominids, primates, and other animals) the im-
age that we have of ourselves as conscious, thinking creatures, in spite of the 
fact that this self-image may well contain features that are typically modern and 
have been acquired only recently. If we knew which of these features are specif-
ically modern acquisitions this would not be a problem, of course, for we could 
then omit them from the image projected onto earlier humans and other crea-
tures. In fact, however, we have no idea how to sort mental features into modern 
and ancient, or into essential features (which any mind must have irrespective of 
its state of development) and accidental features (which may or may not be 
present, depending on the state of development). So, projecting the modern self-
image back into deep history is bound to be fallacious to some degree by inad-
vertently attributing modern mental traits to other types of mind that do (or did) 
not really possess them. Moreover, once the fallacy has been committed, the 
misattributions will tend to stick, and it will become more and more difficult to 
identify and correct them. 
To be sure, not all mental features are equally susceptible to the Flintstones 
fallacy. Basic information processing capacities (e.g., for early vision or senso-
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ry-motor coordination) are largely immune to it. These capacities typically in-
volve neural mechanisms that can be directly identified by neuroscientific 
means in humans as well as in non-human animals. In principle it is no more 
fallacious to attribute them to earlier humans than to attribute them to present-
day animals. Yet even here one should be cautious, both with respect to earlier 
humans and with respect to contemporary non-humans. Although basic ‘micro-
cognitive’ mechanisms can be identified in humans and animals alike, the man-
ner in which they contribute to overall cognitive performance may be quite dif-
ferent. In ordinary, present-day humans the mechanisms are typically described 
partly in terms of their role in overall mental competency at the personal level 
(cf. Bennett and Hacker 2003). Now, obviously one should be careful not to 
transfer these personalist descriptions of neural mechanisms from humans to 
animals, which would go well beyond the licence of neuroscience, and would 
indeed expose one to the Flintstones fallacy. 
The features for which the Flintstones fallacy poses a problem are typically 
those described by folk psychology. Folk psychology is the collection of prac-
tices, principles and conceptual tools that we use for purposes of describing, 
organizing, and communicating our ideas, beliefs, motives, feelings, and rea-
sons for acting. It is the toolkit that we use for identifying and interrelating 
types of mental contents (beliefs, feelings, ideas), states (awareness, understand-
ing, agreeing), processes and episodes (reasoning, dreaming), faculties and atti-
tudes (imagining, remembering, perceiving), and so on, with respect to one’s 
own mental life as well as that of other members of society. Folk psychology in 
this sense is roughly the ordinary “concept of mind” described by Gilbert Ryle 
(1949). What the present argument calls into question, is specifically that the 
familiar concepts of folk psychology can be meaningfully and non-fallaciously 
applied to ancient minds. 
Notice that the Flintstones fallacy may affect our thinking about the mind in 
opposite ways, one projecting present mentality into the past, the other project-
ing past mentality into the present. On the one hand, the evolutionary trend in-
vites us to picture Stone Age man as having an essentially modern mind. On the 
other hand, the same type of reasoning may lead us to picture modern humans 
as “Stone Age brains acting clumsily in modern environments” (Smail 2008, 
149), “Pleistocene hunter-gatherers struggling to survive and reproduce in evo-
lutionarily novel suburban habitats” (Buller 2005, 112), since “the modern mind 
is adapted to the Stone Age, not the computer age” (Pinker 1997, 42). The two 
projections are niftily combined in the following passage on the Neandertal 
mind: 
 
“Much modern thinking is still based on abilities that evolved long ago. It is 
very unlikely that the advent of modern humans was marked by a total reor-
ganization of the brain; it is probable that much modern thinking still con-
sists of processes that evolved in earlier times. Many modern human activi-
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ties place minimal demands on problem solving ability (the overworked 
driving-to-work example). More likely, the neural change leading to moder-
nity was modest and added to the abilities already possessed by premodern 
populations [such as Neandertals]. If we can identify and peel away this final 
acquisition, we should be able to describe the Neandertal mind itself” (Wynn 
and Coolidge 2004, 468–469). 
 
 
The passage characteristically emphasizes the vast continuity between pre-
modern and modern humans, whose minds are claimed to be essentially alike 
except for a “final acquisition.” The driving-to-work example referred to in 
support of continuity adds a comical note, calling up the image of Fred and 
Barney getting ready to face another day at the Bedrock Gravel Company. 
 
3. BIOLOGY 
 
The belief that the human mind has developed very slowly over a vast period 
of time is typically defended by appealing to biological continuity. Assuming 
(1) that the mind is a product of the brain, (2) that brain structure is determined 
by evolution, and (3) that evolution works very slowly, it seems logical to con-
clude (4) that the mind in its contemporary form developed on an evolutionary 
timescale and must have been roughly the same throughout prehistory. 
The validity of the argument is doubtful, however. First, even assuming that 
it could be established that the basic structure of the brain has been the same 
since the dawn of humanity, this would reveal little about the way in which that 
basic structure was used by ancient minds. If earlier humans had modern hard-
ware, so to speak, it does not necessarily follow that they were running modern 
software. The converse is much more plausible: from the software they were 
running one could make a reasonable estimate of hardware requirements. This 
second inference, however, offers no relief of the Flintstones fallacy; it relies on 
a prior insight in the organization of ancient minds (“ancient software”) that 
cannot be established by biology. Biology may be able to sort brain features 
into ancient and modern, but it cannot do the same for specifically mental fea-
tures. 
Moreover, the idea that the development of phenotypical traits such as be-
havioural competencies is determined by slowly working genetic mechanisms 
has also been challenged from within evolutionary theory itself, among others 
by Dual Inheritance Theory (DIT) and Developmental Systems Theory (DST). 
According to DIT the features and competencies sported by normal adults (gen-
erally, mature phenotypes) depend on biologically inherited traits as well as on 
cultural inheritance (Tomasello 1999). Similarly, DST explains how non-
genetic factors (such as cultural traditions) may systematically shape biological 
structures and capacities, including those of the brain, provided that they are 
reliably present in every generation (Oyama et al. 2001). Because non-genetic 
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factors can operate on much shorter time scales than genetic factors, psycholo-
gy’s focus on deep history is probably misguided. Relatively recent changes in 
mental architecture may be consistent with a sophisticated view of evolution. 
Finally, advanced imaging technologies in cognitive neuroscience point up 
the importance of neuroplasticity for understanding the cognitive functions of 
the human brain, in particular that of the neocortex (for an overview, see Pascu-
al-Leone et al. 2005). Human brains are intrinsically able to reconfigure them-
selves in dynamic response to changing environmental pressures, notably in-
cluding cultural conditions. How this relates to specific features of our self-
understanding as thinking creatures is still unclear, but it seems likely that the 
modern mind to some degree exploits the bandwidth of cortical plasticity, syn-
aptically adapting itself to prevailing social, cultural and technological condi-
tions. Research in the field of situated cognition strongly suggests that the hu-
man brain dynamically interacts with structural features of its cognitive ecolo-
gy, which act as scaffolds for many of our mental capacities and processes. 
Changing cognitive landscapes will thus accommodate differently tuned brains, 
which in their turn provide for different sorts of mental capacities and processes 
(Clark 2008; Robbins and Aydede 2009). At the very least this is a possibility 
that cannot be ruled out a priori. 
Summing up, biology offers no relief from the Flintstones Fallacy. Indeed, 
new insights rather suggest that many traits of the modern mind may have been 
acquired in recent cultural history. It would certainly be mistaken to project 
these onto Stone Age ancestors. 
 
4. PSYCHOLOGY 
 
The risk of “overinterpetation” is widely acknowledged among scientists 
working on ancient minds. With regard to prehistoric tools, for example, ar-
chaeologist Thomas Wynn called for caution when bringing modern concep-
tions of tool production to bear on the production of stone handaxes: 
 
“It would be difficult to overemphasize just how strange the handaxe is 
when compared to the products of modern culture. It does not fit easily into 
our understanding of what tools are, and its makers do not fit easily into our 
understanding of what humans are” (Wynn 1995, 21). 
 
Notwithstanding the appreciation of the risks involved, there is widespread 
confidence that our present conception of the mind can reliably be used as a 
starting-point for modeling earlier humans and hominids. Biological considera-
tions aside, can psychology offer a basis for this confidence? 
Conjectures about the mental traits and capacities of early hominids typically 
take the form of a ‘minimal’ psychological model. The model is minimal in the 
sense that it contains only those psychological competencies that are strictly 
necessary for explaining specific behavioural traits such as producing handaxes, 
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hunting and gathering, or generally coping with specific ecological and social 
conditions. The aim of minimalism is to reduce the risk of inadvertently attrib-
uting to premodern minds traits that are specifically modern, i.e., to avoid the 
Flintstones fallacy. 
Is the minimalist strategy an effective measure against the Flintstone fallacy? 
There are three reasons for doubting this. First, for minimalism to be successful 
against the Flintstones fallacy it should be able to describe the behaviour that 
needs to be explained in a sufficiently “neutral” way, i.e., without implicating 
our modern self-understanding as mindful beings. This is the point made by 
Wynn in the above quotation. By describing relics from the past as “tools,” for 
example, a host of connotations about modern production and use of tools is 
implicated, including expectations about the user’s consciousness, instrumental 
rationality and imagination. It is not at all clear whether sufficiently neutral 
descriptions can be given; the Flintstones fallacy looms large here. 
Secondly, for the psychological model of ancient minds to be truly ‘mini-
mal’, it must assume that it makes sense to isolate specific mental traits and 
competencies and lift them from the ordinary context in terms of which we 
commonly understand human psychology. We have a relatively clear grasp of 
what specific competencies (e.g., imagination, memory, or communication) 
amount to in present-day peers, but what is left of these competencies when 
taken in isolation and projected onto an alien past? Without the socio-cultural 
backdrop of modern folk psychology the attribution of isolated competencies 
seems to make little or no sense. For example, what would it mean to ascribe a 
minimal capacity for communication to our ancient forebears? Is this supposed 
to involve also a capacity for having beliefs and desires, for thinking, reasoning, 
self-expression, imagination, and other mental aptitudes that we routinely asso-
ciate with communication in ordinary life? If not, then what is left of the notion 
of communication? In both cases minimalism defeats its own purposes: first by 
allowing modern self-understanding to paint in the model of the ancient mind 
(which is to commit the Flintstones fallacy), secondly by attributing mental 
traits that are void of meaning. 
A final worry about the prospects for psychological minimalism concerns 
the implicit assumption that we can reliably tell which mental traits and compe-
tencies are needed for an agent to display certain types of behaviour. We are 
indeed fairly dexterous in assessing the relationship between competence and 
performance in present-day, normal, adult peers performing under normal con-
ditions; that is the essence of folk psychology. Turning to abnormal conditions, 
however, or to abnormal humans (infants, seniles, people suffering from mental 
disorders and brain lesions), folk psychology soon ceases to be a reliable guide. 
It is to be expected that the same is true a fortiori of ancient minds, which are 
both abnormal and acting under abnormal conditions (as seen from our present-
day point of view, of course). 
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A telling example is the interpretation of prehistoric cave art such as found 
in Chauvet and Lascaux, France. The received opinion has long been that the 
ancient artists of these paintings must be credited with “essentially modern 
minds” boasting sophisticated capacities for symbolization and communication; 
how else could one make sense of their beautiful, strikingly naturalistic paint-
ings? This interpretation has been contested by Nicholas Humphrey (1998), 
who drew attention to resemblances between typical cave drawings and artwork 
produced in the early 1970s by a virtually languageless, autistic girl named Na-
dia between the age of 3 and 6 years. Nadia is obviously not a paragon of the 
modern mind with sophisticated capacities for symbolization and communica-
tion. What is more, Nadia’s drawing abilities actually deteriorated once she had 
acquired a modicum of language. Hence, Humphrey argued, the attribution of 
advanced communication capacities to these ancient minds may have been 
jumping to conclusions. 
What the example shows is that common intuitions about mental competen-
cy and behavioural performance are quite unreliable outside of their ordinary 
context. When we bound down into deep history convinced of these intuitions, 
we are prone to paint a caricature of our ancestors. 
 
5. PHILOSOPHY 
 
Modeling ancient minds on the basis of present self-conception poses a haz-
ard, but that in itself does not prove the modeling wrong. It takes specific evi-
dence in specific cases to falsify specific proposals for reconstructing ancient 
psychology. Understood as an empirically defeasible principle, then, it may still 
be warranted to work from the assumption that ancient and modern minds are 
substantially continuous. Indeed, there seem to be a priori reasons for thinking 
that this is the appropriate way to proceed. I shall consider a number of argu-
ments to this effect. If allowed to stand they take a bite out of the Flintstones 
fallacy: painting ancient minds in modern colours would not be fallacious until 
proven otherwise. Yet I think that a closer look at the arguments actually sup-
ports the opposite conclusion, viz., that ancient minds are substantially different 
from modern minds unless proven otherwise. 
First, it may be argued that the conceptual apparatus of folk psychology is 
logically indispensable for describing and explaining ancient minds. Studies 
that are not couched in these terms are not doing psychology at all: their subject 
is not the ancient mind but something else instead, for instance ancient anthro-
pology. Hence, it is self-contradictory to claim that the vocabulary of present 
self-understanding does not apply to ancient minds. 
This argument is well-known from discussions of eliminative materialism 
(cf. Von Eckhardt 1984). In the context of contemporary minds it makes good 
sense: not even cognitive neuroscience can do without folk psychology as a 
continuing constraint on what counts as an adequate explanation of properly 
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psychological phenomena. In a historical context the argument is much less 
convincing, however. If present folk psychology is supposed to apply neces-
sarily, a wildly implausible form of psychological essentialism ensues. It would 
be logically impossible for the human mind to have undergone any substantial 
change at all, which is unacceptable both from an evolutionary and from a de-
velopmental point of view. Moreover, given the special role of contemporary 
folk psychology vis-à-vis understanding contemporary minds, it seems plausible 
to argue by parity of reasoning that the indicated frame of reference for under-
standing ancient minds is ancient folk psychology rather than present one. 
The first argument is obviously too strong, but it is possible to settle for a 
weaker claim to achieve the same result. Even though it is not logically neces-
sary that ordinary folk psychology suits earlier minds (which allows it to be 
empirically defeasible), it is still intuitively highly probable. Conversely, it is 
intuitively reprehensible to believe that earlier humans did not sport the same 
basic mental features that we have. A typical example of this line of thought is 
Ned Block’s reply to the suggestion that earlier humans did not have conscious 
access to their own thoughts: 
 
“Could there have been a time when humans who are biologically the same 
as us never had the contents of their perceptions and thoughts poised for free 
use in reasoning or in rational control of action? Is this ability one that cul-
ture imparts to us as children? (...) There is no reason to take such an idea se-
riously” (Block 1995, 238). 
 
For Block it is intuitively quite unlikely that humans “just like us” could be 
different from us with respect to basic mental traits such as consciousness. 
Hence, until evidence to the contrary is found, it is safe to assume that our pre-
sent-day conception of conscious creatures applies to earlier humans as well as 
it does to us. 
Can intuitions succeed where logic failed? I frankly admit that I share 
Block’s intuitions and that I find them quite strong. Yet I think we should be 
critical of them; uncritical reliance on intuition breeds parochialism. Now, the 
argument hinges on the reliability of our common intuitions about the features 
that mindful beings can be credited with. As pointed out in the previous section, 
these intuitions spring from our present self-conception as mindful creatures, 
i.e., from modern folk psychology. It stands to reason that they can be trusted 
with regard to present psychological peers, i.e., with regard to those members of 
community with whom we share a common folk psychology. However, as we 
move to the fringes of that circle of peers (e.g., when considering pathological 
cases and infants), these intuitions tend to break down rapidly and cease to be 
reliable. It is quite unlikely that our intuitions perform any better with respect to 
ancient minds, taking into account that these are even further removed from the 
compass of present community. Indeed, modern intuitions seem to be quite 
inappropriate here. Given the fact that intuitions springing from modern folk 
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psychology work well for modern peers, it is to be expected that intuitions 
based on ancient folk psychology work well for ancient minds. If folk psychol-
ogy has changed in the course of history (which can hardly be ruled out a pri-
ori), it follows that modern intuitions do not fit ancient minds. Of course it re-
mains to be seen whether ancient folk psychologies can be meaningfully recon-
structed, especially when the empirical evidence is scarce and ambiguous as in 
the case of prehistoric minds, and how much cultural and historical variation 
can be found. These strike me as empirical questions, however, not to be decid-
ed a priori (cf. Sleutels 2006). 
That last suggestion can be contested. One may doubt on hermeneutical 
grounds that it is possible to find evidence of folk psychologies that are substan-
tially different from our own. All interpretation is to some extent translation into 
one’s own conceptual scheme. Any purportedly alien folk psychology will get 
translated into our own conceptual scheme, and will be assimilated to modern 
folk psychology in the process of interpretation. Even assuming for the sake of 
argument that there actually were folk psychologies substantially different from 
our own, these would be hermeneutically inscrutable. Only upon translation 
would it be possible to understand them as being instances of folk psychology at 
all, but then they would no longer appear substantially different from our own 
(cf. Davidson 1984; Rorty 1972). 
It is admittedly hard to keep our present self-image from obtruding itself 
when interpreting other cultures (Winch 1964). As Jerry Fodor once put it,  
 
“there is, so far as I know, no human group that doesn’t explain behavior by 
imputing beliefs and desires to behavior. (And if an anthropologist claimed 
to have found such a group, I wouldn’t believe him.)” (Fodor 1987, 123).  
 
Yet, the hermeneutical argument seems to overshoot itself by making deviant 
psychologies impossible to detect in principle. In practice, however, disciplines 
such as developmental, cultural, historical, and abnormal psychology are quite 
able to identify deviant folk psychologies, for which there is evidence in abun-
dance. For example, autistic persons and young children can be diagnosed with 
an inability to attribute false beliefs to others (the so-called Sally-Anne test), 
indicating that they do not command the “theory of mind” used by the rest of us 
(Baron-Cohen et al. 1985). Work in ethnopsychology suggests that there is con-
siderable cross-cultural variation in how people parse the mental domain, con-
ceptualize their peers, and explain their behaviour (Lillard 1998). Studies in 
developmental and cultural psychology indicate that ordinary Western folk psy-
chology is imbued with literacy; both pristinely oral cultures and pre-literate 
children show a manner of type-identifying and interrelating mental contents 
that is different from standard folk psychological practice (Olson 1994). As a 
final (and provocative) example, ancient Achaeans described their actions as 
being inspired by alien voices (‘voices of the gods’), which raises questions 
about their ability to consciously control their own behaviour on the basis of 
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rational deliberation (Jaynes 1976). The hermeneutical challenge in all of these 
cases is not to let expectations from ordinary folk psychology overrule the em-
pirical evidence. This may be difficult (Block and Fodor could not resist), but it 
is not impossible. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
The Flintstones fallacy is an underrated risk in evolutionary psychology and 
philosophy. There is widespread confidence that we are by and large able to 
avoid the fallacy, even when projecting our conception of the mind back onto 
ancestors in deep history. If the differences between ancient minds and modern 
minds were well-understood, or if one could be sure that they are small, this 
confidence might be defensible. Neither of these is true, however. Standard 
biological arguments fail to establish that the basic structure of the mind is an-
cient. Standard procedures in psychology, based on our modern self-conception 
as mindful creatures, systematically downgrade putative differences between 
ancient and modern minds. A priori arguments from philosophy do not warrant 
the presumption that ancient minds were substantially like modern minds unless 
proven otherwise. Indeed, each of these fields has better arguments for the con-
trary view that the mind as we know it from present-day experience is not an-
cient at all, but was contrived in relatively recent history as a product of contin-
gent cultural practices exploiting the considerable bandwidth of human neuro-
plasticity. 
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